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Developments in Contract Law: The 2020-2021 Term – Appeals to Fairness
Marcus Moore

This article analyzes important developments in Contract Law stemming from
consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada in 2020-2021. Due to the large
number of Contracts cases during this period, the article focuses on prominent
appeals occupied with issues of fairness in Canadian Contract Law. Fairness in
contracts emerges as an important concern of the SCC at this juncture. This
appropriately reflects the constellation of some long-unsolved problems (e.g.,
control of unfair terms in standard form contracts), confusion around key concepts
associated with protection of contractual fairness (e.g., unconscionability and good
faith), and judicial disagreement over the merits of general versus context-specific
approaches to policing fairness in contracts (e.g., unconscionability versus public
policy, and whether to consolidate or differentiate how the concepts of
unconscionability and good faith apply to different contexts falling within each’s
overall jurisdiction).
xxiii

Developments in Contract Law: The
2020-2021 Term – Appeals to Fairness
Marcus Moore*
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes important developments in Contract Law stemming from
consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) during the 2020-2021 term.
Due to the large number of cases during this period, I focus here on prominent
appeals occupied with issues of fairness in Contract Law. Fairness in contracts
emerges — appropriately — as an important concern of the SCC at this juncture.
This reflects in part some longstanding problems of unfairness in the market, notably
unfair terms in standard form contracts. As well, it reflects continuing confusion
around the parameters of some judicial heads of fairness supervision, in particular
unconscionability and good faith. And it reflects in part judicial policy choices
around how to approach the regulation of fairness in contracts. These are inherent,
for example, in whether to use unconscionability or public policy, and in whether to
differentiate or consolidate how unconscionability and good faith each deal with
quite different contexts of contractual unfairness falling within their respective
jurisdictions. I will review noteworthy recent developments in Contract Law
relating to other matters in next year’s volume.
II. FAIRNESS

IN THE

MAKING

OF

CONTRACTS

I begin by looking at developments relating to laws governing fairness in the
making of contracts. These developments arise from the Supreme Court’s judgment
in Uber Technologies v. Heller.1 The underlying dispute in that case concerned the
enforceability of an arbitration clause in a standard form contract between gig
economy colossus Uber and its drivers in Ontario, which included the plaintiff
Heller. The clause was not enforced. Justices Abella and Rowe, writing for a
majority of seven justices, invalidated the clause as unconscionable. Justice Brown,
concurring, relied instead on public policy to find it unenforceable. Justice Côté,
dissenting, would have enforced the clause (with some judicial winnowing). In the
following sections, I discuss the significance of developments relating to control of
unfair terms in standard form contracts, unconscionability, and public policy, all of
which concern fairness in the making of contracts.
*
Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia; Centre for Socio-Legal Studies,
Regulation Discussion Group, University of Oxford. The author thanks Hugh Collins for his
helpful comments on an earlier draft, as well as Jenny Lu, YiFei Yang, Jason Sug and Alexa
Redford for their research assistance.
1
Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Uber”].
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1. Control of Unfair Terms in Standard Form Contracts
One of the most intractable problems of Contract Law has been unfair terms in
standard form contracts.2 The sharply contrasting roles of form-drafter and
form-recipient that crystallize in the form-contracting process allow the drafting
party to decide, beyond the few “core” terms actually discussed and agreed, the
remaining terms. And they have often abused this power to include among these
form terms some which are “clauses of oppression and outrage”.3 Courts have found
it necessary to enforce these contracts, recognizing that they are “a pervasive and
indispensable feature of modern commercial life. It is simply not feasible to
negotiate . . . the terms of many of the transactions entered into in the course of
daily life.”4
Historically, common law judges sometimes tried to deal with unfair standard
form terms by manipulating processes like interpretation, implication or incorporation to cut the unfair term down or out of the form.5 However this could only be
done occasionally and thus inconsistently without discrediting those processes and
thereby detracting from their ordinary functions.6 As a result, many jurisdictions in
the common law and beyond, including civilian Quebec and Europe, moved to
legislate controls of substantively unfair standard form terms.7 There is some
variation by jurisdiction in whether controls cover only consumer forms, or also
include small-business, commercial forms, or all forms.8 The United States has a
2

I use the phrase “standard form contract” throughout this publication in its narrow/
precise sense (a.k.a. “contract of adhesion”). Some writings use “standard form contract” to
refer to a broader array of standard contracts. But the word form was added by Karl Llewellyn
to distinguish those standard contracts which are preformulated and simply agreed to by the
recipient. For an expanded discussion of the issues in this section, see Marcus Moore,
“Controlling Fairness in Standard Form Contracts: What Can Courts Do, and What Should
They Do?” (2022) 55:2 U.B.C. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
3

Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston; Toronto:
Little, Brown, 1960), at 366.
4

John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 185.

5

Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-302 Cmt 1.

6

Karl Llewellyn, “Book Review” (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, at 702-703.

7

See, e.g., Council Directive 93/13/EC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts [1993] O.J. L095/29 [hereinafter “UCTD”]; Consumer Rights Act 2015 Part 2
(U.K.); Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (U.K.); Fair Trading Act 1986 No. 121, ss. 26A,
46H-M (New Zealand); Australian Consumer Law, ss. 23-28; Civil Code of Québec,
CCQ-1991, arts. 1437-1438.
8
Council Directive 93/13/EC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts
[1993] O.J. L095/29; Consumer Rights Act 2015 Part 2 (U.K.); Unfair Contract Terms Act
1977 (U.K.); Fair Trading Act 1986 No. 121, ss. 26A, 46H-M (New Zealand); Australian
Consumer Law, ss. 23-28; Civil Code of Québec, CCQ-1991, arts. 1437-1438. Australia
covers small business. Quebec covers all forms. Germany, the Netherlands and France cover
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judicial control, inspired by the unconscionability section of the Uniform Commercial Code chapter on Sale, which American courts drew upon “either by analogy or
as an expression of a general doctrine” to fashion a judicial control applicable to any
form.9 All of the above control regimes assess unfairness based essentially on
notions of considerable imbalance in favour of the form-drafter at the expense of the
form-recipient.10
With this as context, the absence of a control of somewhat general scope in
Canadian common law has been both notable and regrettable. Some specialized
controls exist, but general controls of the types found elsewhere have been a glaring
omission as far as protecting fairness in contracts in common law Canada.11 After
all, belied by the continued focus of Contracts treatises and law school courses on
the classical negotiated contract, standard form contracts overwhelmingly dominate
contracting practice.12 The scale across which this unfairness projects is thus
immense. And it has been amplified in recent years by factors such as globalization,
privatization and digitization assigning more and more of the governance of formal
social activity to standard form contracts.13 In short, unfair terms in standard form
contracts are a major systemic contributor to the unprecedented inequalities of
wealth in contemporary society, and thus to the wide-ranging and increasingly
worrisome social consequences that flow from such disparities.
In my view, the most welcome development in Canadian Contract Law in the
term reviewed by this paper was the Supreme Court’s assertion, supported by a
seven-justice majority in Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, that judges in Canadian
common law are justified in exercising control of unfair terms in standard form
contracts.14
The method by which the Uber judgment pursued control, and the parameters
around this potentiality, were more uneven in their impact on realizing the desired
aim, as I will explain.
all commercial forms per the UCTD, under which consumer forms are just the minimum that
states are directed to include.
9

E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts, 4th ed. (New York: Aspen, 2004) § 4.28, at 298-99;
Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-302; Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
10

Text to note 6.

11

For a partial inventory of specialized controls in Canadian provinces, see Stephen
Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 7th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2017), at para. 545.
12

Friedrich Kessler, “Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract” (1943) 43:5 Colum. L. Rev. 629; W. David Slawson, “Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power” (1971) 84(3) Harv. L. Rev. 529.
13

Marcus Moore, Regulating Boilerplate: Resolving the Problems of Imposition and
Unfairness in Standard Form Contracts (Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2022).
14

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 56-59,
85, 87, 89-91 (S.C.C.).
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Following the case’s handling in the lower courts, the majority relied on the
unconscionability doctrine of English origin as a basis for interrogating the fairness
of the arbitration clause at issue.15 Traditionally, that doctrine had not been used to
deal with standard form terms; rather, it had been concerned with unusual situations
of bargains entered into through the exploitation of a party under a special
disability.16 But in Uber, Abella and Rowe JJ. counted the form-contracting process
towards the required procedural element of the doctrine.17 This was significant in
that, if the procedural element is met, what remains is the inquiry into substantive
fairness — thus establishing control.18
However, the judgment left it unclear whether form-contracting by itself does
suffice. Also cited were factors particular to the circumstances of the case, such as
the plaintiff driver’s lack of sophistication, limited financial means, and deception in
the sense that unexpected implications of the arbitration agreement were effectively
concealed.19 If these factors were necessary parts of establishing the doctrine’s
procedural condition, then it will not apply absent similar particularized sources of
disparate bargaining power, and thus will not provide a general fairness control of
standard form contract terms. Also, the majority expressed the reservation that “we
do not mean to suggest that a standard form contract, by itself, establishes” the
doctrine’s procedural condition.20 Examples given of cases where it was suggested
that control would not apply included where “sufficient explanations or advice . . .
offset uncertainty about the terms” or where the drafting party “clearly and
effectively communicate[s] the meaning of clauses with unusual or onerous
15

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 55
(S.C.C.); Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., [2019] O.J. No. 1, 2019 ONCA 1, at paras. 60-62
(Ont. C.A.); Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., [2018] O.J. No. 502, 2018 ONSC 718, at paras.
68, 75 (Ont. S.C.J.). On the genealogy of the doctrine, see Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian
Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2014), at 520ff.
16

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 54-55,
173 (S.C.C.); Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution
(Toronto: LexisNexis, 2014), at 520ff; Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections on the
Canadian Unconscionability Doctrine” (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 171; Rick Bigwood,
Exploitative Contracts (Oxford: Oxford, 2004), s. 6.4.
17

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 87-93
(S.C.C.).
18

On the depiction of the doctrine as divided into procedural and substantive elements,
see, e.g., Stephen Smith, Contract Theory (Oxford: Oxford, 2004), at 343.
19

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 93-94
(S.C.C.).
20
Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 88
(S.C.C.).

6

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACT LAW: THE 2020-2021 TERM – APPEALS TO FAIRNESS

effects”.21 Thus, control does not apply where enhanced information is provided.
This reflects the thesis that with that, the form-recipient could better protect itself in
the bargaining process. But this thesis has been thoroughly discredited in the
standard form context.22 It ignores the fact that whether or not the recipient is
informed, the contract is take-it-or-leave-it in a context where leaving it likely just
means having to take a similar form from a rival firm. This is because there is
insufficient competition over form terms in modern society, where contracting is a
near-constant activity and parties have no time to negotiate every term.23 Also, the
warning-based exception above resembles long-existent “red-hand” rules requiring
special notice for incorporation of onerous terms, which drafting parties often
manage to satisfy in continuing to include such terms.24 Of note, unfair terms
regulations — including legislated regimes and the American judicial control —
apply even if the adherent is well informed. Generally, they only make exceptions
for the “core” terms (typically subject matter and price) actually negotiated.25
Another way in which Uber sought to shift the doctrine towards providing a
control of fairness in standard form contracts was its term-specific invalidation of
just the impugned arbitration clause.26 Traditionally, the doctrine’s effect was to
rescind a transaction as a whole.27 A term-specific effect, leaving the rest of the
21

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 88
(S.C.C.).
22

Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure
of Mandated Disclosure (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), ch 2; Yannis
Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David Trossen, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts” (2014) 43:1 J.L.S. 1; American Law
Institute, Restatement on Consumer Contracts - Tentative Draft (ALI, 2019), at 35.
23
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure
of Mandated Disclosure (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), ch 2; Yannis
Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David Trossen, “Does Anyone Read the Fine Print?
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts” (2014) 43:1 J.L.S. 1; American Law
Institute, Restatement on Consumer Contracts - Tentative Draft (ALI, 2019), at 35; Marcus
Moore, Regulating Boilerplate: Resolving the Problems of Imposition and Unfairness in
Standard Form Contracts (Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2022).
24
Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking, [1971] 2 Q.B. 163; Tilden Rent-a-Car Co v.
Clendenning, [1978] O.J. No. 3260, 18 O.R. (2d) 601 (Ont. C.A.).
25

See notes 7 and 9.

26

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 96-99
(S.C.C.).
27
S.M. Waddams, “Unconscionability in Canadian Contract Law” (1992) 14 Loy. LA
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 541, at 543; John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2012), at 440; Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and
Restitution (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2014), at 523; Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., [1965]
B.C.J. No. 178, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710, at 713 (B.C.C.A.); Downer v. Pitcher, [2017] N.J. No.
64, [2017] NLCA 13, at para. 21 (N.L.C.A.); Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J.
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contract intact, is typical of controls elsewhere.28 This is seen as necessary, because
in an economy where many goods are only available via standard form, rescinding
the transaction over an unfair term would deprive people of their exchange needs —
or at the risk of that, induce them not to take action over the unfair term.29 Left
unclear is whether the term-specific application in Uber is generalizable to other
cases of complaints of an unfair standard form term. Notably, the majority cast the
arbitration clause as “a self-contained contract collateral or ancillary to the [main]
agreement”, which brings the application in Uber in line with the doctrine’s normal
application to whole agreements.30
But elsewhere, the majority said that unfair standard form choice of law, forum
selection and arbitration clauses were “precisely the kind of situation in which the
unconscionability doctrine is meant to apply”.31 And Abella and Rowe JJ. added that
“a finding of unconscionability can be directed at a contract as a whole or against
any severable provisions of it”.32 The latter claim is momentous, in that if it does
represent the state of the law, it significantly increases the doctrine’s utility as a
control of unfair standard form terms. However, remarkably, the claim appears only
in a footnote, and the citations are to a different usage of the equitable concept of
“unconscionability”, suggesting possible conflation of the different uses of that
concept.33 As well, not all terms are severable, and the Supreme Court’s approach
to severability is strict.34 Thus, in any case, this stops short of the unencumbered
term-specific application of unfair terms regulations.
Furthermore, the uncertainty of the effect is itself problematic. For example, if the
court finds the term not severable, the result then of avoiding the whole transaction
will often be contrary to the interests of the complainant for the reasons explained
above. As the footnoted claim was about what a finding of unconscionability may be
directed at, this suggests it is up to the court, not the complainant. Given the
uncertainty of the remedy, and the possibility of a “remedy” that does more harm
No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 172 (S.C.C.).
28

See notes 6 and 8.

29

Marcus Moore, Regulating Boilerplate: Resolving the Problems of Imposition and
Unfairness in Standard Form Contracts (Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2022).
30
Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 96
(S.C.C.).
31

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 89
(S.C.C.).
32

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, fn 8 (S.C.C.).

33

Discussed in the next section. Justice Brown indeed reads this as a product of
conflation: Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para.
173 (S.C.C.).
34
Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., [2009] S.C.J. No. 6, 2009 SCC 6,
at para. 32 (S.C.C.).
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than good to the overall interests of a complainant, form-recipients may be reluctant
to bring claims.
Even in cases where an unfair term had a severe impact on a particular
form-recipient such that ex post it is willing to pursue a claim despite the risk of the
whole contract being rescinded, arguably in going beyond what is necessary to
redress the unfairness to the form-recipient, the remedy itself becomes unfair to the
drafting party. Findings of substantive unfairness, of the remedy being to avoid the
whole contract, and perhaps also of the satisfaction of the doctrine’s procedural
condition (discussed above), are precedents applicable to other instances of the
standard form contract’s use on the market. Hence, whether via a class action or
otherwise, this could mean retroactive cancellation of mass transactions, with the
resultant market disruption. Foreseeing this risk, Abella and Rowe JJ. submitted that
it will help, as it will encourage firms to draft fair terms. No expert testimony was
cited in support of this as the calculated effect. If the doctrine’s uncertain effect
deters form-recipients from bringing claims for the reasons noted earlier, then firms
will rather be encouraged to do nothing. But if form-recipients do bring forth claims,
firms face a problem that is more difficult to solve: assessments of substantive
fairness are often subjective, and elsewhere the majority lowered the threshold of
unfairness to be controlled from the high bar typically found in regimes controlling
unfair standard form terms to a standard of unfairness simpliciter.35 As a result, to
avert the whole transaction-type being jeopardized, a firm would have to draft every
term in the form so obviously fair as to be free from the risk of any subjective
opinion finding it unfair. Because firms invest in drafting forms where the
transaction-type is especially important to their interests, this is a fraught business
proposition. Where it is not possible for a firm to draft every form term as obviously
fair, this may alternately encourage an increased number of negotiated terms (with
the added burdens in cost, time and convenience mostly borne by form-recipients).
In other cases, it could result in firms’ abandonment of the Canadian market as
problematic in regard to use of standard forms.
In sum, Uber brought common law Canada closer to a long-needed control of
unfair terms in standard form contracts, but the way it pursued this aim came with
significant complications and drawbacks. A judicial control on the American model
(whose core features are shared with the legislated regimes elsewhere, including in
Quebec) would avoid all these problems.36 Rather than deforming the traditional
doctrine of unconscionability into something somewhat “relevant” to standard form
contracts,37 it would be vastly preferable to follow the well-trodden path of
35

See text to note 9. Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC
16, at paras. 80-82 (S.C.C.).
36

See notes 7 and 9.

37

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16 at paras. 85, 87
(S.C.C.).
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dedicated controls widely found elsewhere.38
2. Unconscionability
As mentioned in the prior section, the way in which the majority in Uber sought
to pursue a control of unfair terms in standard form contracts was through
unconscionability. Unconscionability is a topic of importance in discussions of
fairness in Contract Law. And the developments in Uber with regard to it are
certainly worthy of separate but related consideration under that rubric, as I pursue
in this section.
The starting point for any useful discussion of unconscionability in Canada must
be a recognition that it has been a subject of considerable confusion in Canadian
contract law for some time. In order to avoid perpetuating that confusion, some
preliminary remarks are apposite, before surveying the developments in regard to
unconscionability that took place in Uber.
Unconscionability refers, primarily, to a concept. Most writers understand the
concept to refer to an unconscientious abuse of power in private law. Some envision
it more broadly. Notably, Stephen Waddams, whose influence on Canadian Contract
Law may be unsurpassed, has long espoused a very broad view of unconscionability.39 Indeed, he has used the term “as a synonym for . . . unfairness”.40 It truly is
vital that lawyers working in the area of Contract Law be aware when differing uses
of this term are being made. But on any view of its breadth, what I refer to in this
paragraph is the idea or concept of unconscionability.
There are, secondarily, rules and doctrines which are said to give effect to the idea
of unconscionability. Reflecting his broad conception, Waddams places very many
items in this category, including the rules on forfeitures, penalties, deposits, judicial
and legislative controls on limitation clauses, red-hand rules of incorporation, covert
use of interpretation or implication or consideration to control fairness, good faith,
duress, inequality of bargaining power, undue influence, fiduciary relationships, the
withholding of discretionary remedies, restraint of trade, and legislative provisions
38

See notes 7 and 9. For an expanded discussion of issues in the section below, see
Marcus Moore, “The Flaws of Magic Bullet Theory: Retraining Unconscionability to
Discretely Target Different Contexts of Unfairness in Contracts” (2022) 45:2 Dalhousie L.J.
(forthcoming).
39
S.M. Waddams, “Unconscionability in Contracts” (1976) 39:4 M.L.R. 369; Stephen
Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 7th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2017), c. 14; Marcus
Moore, “Why Does Lord Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still? The Prospects of Finding
a Unifying Principle for Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability” (2018) 134 L.Q.R.
257, at 267-69.
40

Stephen Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 7th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2017),
at ¶ 550.
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aiming at fairness.41 On anyone’s list would also be doctrines referred to using the
underlying concept’s very name of “unconscionability”. These include the unconscionability doctrines of English descent, mentioned earlier, which provide for the
rescission of transactions whose formation was defective, due to the bargaining
process being tainted by exploitation of a party under a special disability.42 As well,
they include the American doctrine of unconscionability, referenced in the prior
section, which is distinct from those of English origin,43 and notably was crafted
with an eye to judicial control of unfair terms in standard form contracts.44
Prior to Uber, unconscionability doctrines of both of these general types existed
in Canada. A doctrine of the English type had long been used in Canada,45 its
leading cases including Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., Cain v. Clarica Life
Insurance Co., Titus v. William F. Cooke Enterprises Inc. and Downer v. Pitcher.46
The SCC’s judgment in Norberg v. Wynrib (itself not a Contracts case) recognized
this doctrine, quoting Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd. as authority on it.47
Meanwhile, an unconscionability doctrine sharing several defining features with the
American doctrine was invoked in Canada in a line of cases headlined by the SCC’s
decisions in Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. and Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways).48 There were
questions whether it applied only to exclusion clauses, which would distinguish it
from the American doctrine, or whether like the American doctrine it applied also
41

Stephen Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 7th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2017),

c. 14.
42

Text to notes 15-16.

43

David Capper, “The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World” (2010) 126
L.Q.R. 403.
44

Text to note 9.

45

Waters v. Donnelly, [1884] O.J. No. 294, 9 O.R. 391 (Ont. H.C.J.).

46

Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., [1965] B.C.J. No. 178, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710 (B.C.C.A.);
Cain v. Clarica Life Insurance Co., [2005] A.J. No. 1743, 2005 ABCA 437 (Alta. C.A.); Titus
v. William F. Cooke Enterprises Inc., [2007] O.J. No. 3148, 2007 ONCA 573 (Ont. C.A.);
Downer v. Pitcher, [2017] N.J. No. 64, 2017 NLCA 13 (N.L.C.A.).
47

Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] S.C.J. No. 60, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226, at 248 (S.C.C.).

48

Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 23, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 426 (S.C.C.); Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and
Highways), [2010] S.C.J. No. 4, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69 (S.C.C.); see also ABB Inc. v. Domtar
Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461 (S.C.C.); Guarantee Co. of North America v.
Gordon Capital Corp., [1999] S.C.J. No. 60, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 423 (S.C.C.); Plas-Tex Canada
Ltd. v. Dow Chemical of Canada Ltd., [2004] A.J. No. 1098, [2004] ABCA 309 (Alta. C.A.);
Douez v. Facebook Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751 (S.C.C.) (Abella J.);
TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, [2019] S.C.J. No. 19, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 144 (S.C.C.).
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to other types of unfair terms.49 But Chief Justice Dickson was explicit in Hunter
Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd.: “exclusion clauses are not the only
contractual provisions which may lead to unfairness. There appears to be no sound
reason for applying special rules in the case of clauses excluding liability than for
other clauses producing harsh results.”50 That the doctrine from this line of cases
could apply to an unfair clause of any type was also the conclusion of some leading
Contracts scholars, including Waddams, who wrote that “the implication of” the
SCC using the term unconscionability is “that other kinds of unfair clauses may be
disallowed if they are unconscionable”,51 as well as John McCamus, who saw that
it could thus provide “a common law device long awaited by some, to ameliorate the
harsh impact of unfair terms in boilerplate” (a statement quoted with approval in
Douez v. Facebook Inc.).52 The initial cases’ focus on exclusion clauses likely just
reflected that those cases simultaneously retired the doctrine of fundamental
breach.53 The unconscionability doctrine from this case-line has since been held to
apply for instance to standard form limitation clauses (not just exclusion), forum
selection clauses and arbitration clauses.54
Unfortunately, as a result of the confusion over whether it applied only to
exclusion clauses, and the elusive discussion in those cases more generally, this
doctrine had not yet developed into an established judicial control of unfair terms by
the time of Uber. With two doctrines sharing the name unconscionability and
perhaps lack of awareness that this simply reflected a broad equitable concept said
to animate them (and in the view of some authors, many other doctrines and rules
known under other names, as noted), the lower courts in Uber conflated the two
doctrines.55 This contaminated the case record, so that either the conflation
continued, or the SCC was induced to try to fuse or harmonize the two doctrines to
49

See, e.g., John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012),
at 440 ff.
50

Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 23, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 426, at 461 (S.C.C.).
51
S.M. Waddams, “Abusive or Unconscionable Clauses from a Common Law Perspective” (2010) 49 Can. Bus. L.J. 378, at 391.
52

John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012), at 444.
Douez v. Facebook Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751, at paras. 113-114 (S.C.C.)
(Abella J.).
53

Karsales (Harrow) Ltd. v. Wallis, [1956] 1 W.L.R. 936.

54

ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461, at para. 82
(S.C.C.); Douez v. Facebook Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 33, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 751, at para. 112
(S.C.C.) (Abella J.); TELUS Communications Inc. v. Wellman, [2019] S.C.J. No. 19, [2019]
2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 85 (S.C.C.).
55

Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., [2019] O.J. No. 1, [2019] ONCA 1, at paras. 60-62
(Ont. C.A.); Heller v. Uber Technologies Inc., [2018] O.J. No. 502, 2018 ONSC 718, at paras.
68, 75 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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prevent ongoing similar confusion in future cases. The troubles overviewed in the
last section regarding the means by which the Court sought to establish judicial
control of standard form terms all stem from this conflation.
The surest way to rectify this, and achieve the desired standard form term control,
would be to simply disambiguate the two doctrines, and use as the control the one
from the Hunter Engineering Co. v. Syncrude Canada Ltd. and Tercon Contractors
Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways) case-line designed for that
purpose on the model of controls elsewhere, including the judicial control in the
U.S. and the legislated control in Quebec.56 It could be distinguished as the doctrine
of “unconscionable clauses”,57 from the English-type doctrine of “unconscionable
bargains”.58 The latter is still needed to deal with the different sorts of situations it
has traditionally been occupied with: enabling in exceptional circumstances for the
avoidance of transactions entered into through exploitation of a party under a special
disability.59
With this in mind, it might be expected that the conflation of the two
unconscionability doctrines in Uber could result also in significant changes to how
the conglomerate doctrine applies to situations other than unfair terms in standard
form contracts. Several elements of the judgment support that hypothesis.
Prior to Uber, the unconscionable bargains doctrine required that the complainant
suffered from a special disability such as “ignorance, need or distress”, “blindness,
deafness, illness, senility, or similar disability”.60 Uber generalized and liberalized
the procedural condition to require only inequality of bargaining power.61 This
change vastly expands the circumstances in which the doctrine can apply — as was
clearly intended.62 The doctrine might then become of central significance in
practice, supervising substantive unfairness where freedom of contract otherwise
invites unfairness in cases where there is inequality of bargaining power.
56

See notes 7 and 9.

57

From the title of UCC § 2-302, which inspired it: see note 9.

58

A name commonly used for it in England and other common law jurisdictions.

59

See note 16.

60

Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., [1965] B.C.J. No. 178, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710, at 713
(B.C.C.A.); Cain v. Clarica Life Insurance Co., [2005] A.J. No. 1743, [2005] ABCA 437, at
para. 32 (Alta. C.A.).
61

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 62-68,
72 (S.C.C.). This was said to follow Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] S.C.J. No. 60, [1992] 2 S.C.R.
226 (S.C.C.); however, Norberg used this merely to label the procedural condition, on whose
requirements it quoted Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., [1965] B.C.J. No. 178, 55 D.L.R. (2d)
710, at 713 (B.C.C.A.), which said the inequality had to “aris[e] out of” the special disabilities
quoted.
62
Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 60,
82 (S.C.C.).
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It would greatly advance fairness in contracts if we could distinguish the normal
and appropriate use of bargaining power from its abuse — especially abuse to
systemically amplify pre-existing socio-economic disparities — and counter this.
The difficulty is that the doctrine’s effect is not to somehow make a contract more
fair. Rather, as one of Contract Law’s vitiating doctrines, it operates to rescind
transactions.63
This effect is suitable for the doctrine’s traditional scope of application to
exceptional situations of exploitation of a special disability — quintessential cases
cited by Uber including “rescue at sea”, “financial desperation” or cognitive
impairment.64 Not exceptional in this way is inequality of bargaining power; indeed,
courts have observed that inequality of bargaining power attends almost every
contract.65 It has been said, for instance, that “any individual wanting to borrow
money from a bank, building society or other financial institution in order to pay his
liabilities or buy some property he urgently wants to acquire will have virtually no
bargaining power”.66 As far as sources of inequality, the Uber majority added that
“differences in wealth, knowledge, or experience may be relevant, but inequality
encompasses more than just those attributes . . . There are no ‘rigid limitations’ on
the types of inequality that fit this description.”67 Hence, expansive is the scope of
contracts potentially meeting the procedural condition of the doctrine as modified by
Uber — and thus at risk of rescission. This significantly reduces stability of contract.
And that is a foundational problem, for just as order is a precondition of justice,
stability of contract is a precondition of fairness and other virtues we might wish to
see reflected in markets or their regulation. Moreover, any disruption that occurs will
likely not be limited to exchange, as business arrangements of all kinds are planned
around the contracts that parties make and assume to be valid.
Reinforcing the points just made was another change in Uber, alluded to earlier:
the lowering of the bar of substantive unfairness required to trigger unconscionability.68 Previously, qualifiers such as “gross” or “substantial” unfairness conveyed
this high bar.69 Abella and Rowe JJ.’s rejection of the high bar, and endorsement of
63

Text to note 27.

64

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 69-71
(S.C.C.).
65

See, e.g., Floyd v. Couture, [2004] A.J. No. 377, [2004] ABQB 238, at para. 146 (Alta.
C.A.); Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. & Ors v. Total Oil (GB) Ltd., [1985] 1 W.L.R. 173, at 183
(Dillon L.J.).
66

Alec Lobb (Garages) Ltd. & Ors v. Total Oil (GB) Ltd., [1985] 1 W.L.R. 173, at 183
(Dillon L.J.).
67

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 67
(S.C.C.).
68

Text to note 35.

69

Cain v. Clarica Life Insurance Co., [2005] A.J. No. 1743, [2005] ABCA 437, at para.

14

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACT LAW: THE 2020-2021 TERM – APPEALS TO FAIRNESS

the doctrine applying to unfairness simpliciter, further expands the number of
contracts subject to being rescinded as unconscionable.70 The thinking behind the
adoption of this new position seems to have been that the rationales for deferring to
freedom of contract are absent where there has already been found to be an
inequality of bargaining power.71 An inclination to see its value as attenuated in
circumstances where, in practice, freedom of contract substantially means the
freedom of one party to impose its will on the other, is understandable. But that
leaves the key question of what is the alternative? In some civil law jurisdictions,
including Quebec, prodigious use of legislated terms for nominate contracts
effectively circumscribes freedom of contract.72 But this is not necessarily limited to
situations of inequality of bargaining power. And this approach’s cost in lost
freedom outside those situations, and the resulting constraints on market experimentation and potential innovation, have never been welcomed in the common
law.73 In the present context, the alternative in question is that courts condition the
validity of more contracts on an assessment of their substantive fairness, measured
to a fine degree of precision. It is doubtful that courts have the institutional capacity
to accommodate a burden as onerous as that would be. And the subjectiveness of
fairness assessments at that degree of precision would invite opportunistic litigation,
which would exacerbate the burden on courts. All of this would come again at the
expense of the foundational interest in stability of contract. The traditional high bar
of substantive unfairness for unconscionability reflected the thinking that disrupting
stability of contract was unworkable other than exceptionally where the unfairness
was intolerable. Hence, even Lord Denning suggested that relief be restricted to
where the inequality of bargaining power was “grievous” and the substance “very”
unfair.74
Another development in Uber with respect to unconscionable bargains was
elimination of the doctrine’s knowledge requirement. Traditionally, the doctrine
required that the defendant of the unconscionability claim knew, or perhaps ought
32 (Alta. C.A.); Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., [1965] B.C.J. No. 178, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710,
at 713 (B.C.C.A.); Floyd v. Couture, [2004] A.J. No. 377, [2004] ABQB 238, at para. 150
(Alta. Q.B.); Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections on the Canadian Unconscionability
Doctrine” (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 171, at 192, 194.
70

Text to note 35.

71

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 59
(S.C.C.).
72

Civil Code of Québec, CCQ-1991, Book V, Title II.

73

Marcus Moore, Regulating Boilerplate: Resolving the Problems of Imposition and
Unfairness in Standard Form Contracts (Bloomsbury, forthcoming 2022).
74

Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, [1975] 1 Q.B. 326, at 339; Marcus Moore, “Why Does Lord
Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still? The Prospects of Finding a Unifying Principle for
Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability” (2018) 134 L.Q.R. 257, at 274.
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to have known, of its counterpart’s impairment.75 But the majority in Uber found
such a requirement to be both unnecessary and improper.76 Notably, a knowledge
requirement conflicted with Abella and Rowe JJ.’s reconception of unconscionability as about protecting vulnerability, regardless of whether the other party had acted
unconscientiously or innocently.77 As they wrote:
The purpose of unconscionability [is] the protection of vulnerable persons in
transactions with others . . . Unconscionability, in our view, is meant to protect
those who are vulnerable in the contracting process from loss or improvidence . . .
A weaker party, after all, is as disadvantaged by inadvertent exploitation as by
deliberate exploitation.78

The significance of a knowledge requirement had been to establish a minimum
level of wrongdoing by the party seeking to uphold the contract: even without a
more active form of exploitation, to conclude the contract knowing that its
counterpart was impaired, or perhaps knowing of circumstances that should have led
it to take steps that would have revealed that, was an unconscientious advantagetaking.79 Without this element, it comprised “strict liability”, as Brown J. put it, or
perhaps strict unenforceability.80 In the view of Brown J., this change represented a
75

Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2014), at 537, 544-548; John McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Irwin Law, 2012), at 431; Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections on the Canadian
Unconscionability Doctrine” (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 171, at 195; Marcus Moore, “Why
Does Lord Denning’s Lead Balloon Intrigue Us Still? The Prospects of Finding a Unifying
Principle for Duress, Undue Influence and Unconscionability” (2018) 134 L.Q.R. 257, at
273-78; Morrison v. Coast Finance Ltd., [1965] B.C.J. No. 178, 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710, at 714
(B.C.C.A.); Cain v. Clarica Life Insurance Co., [2005] A.J. No. 1743, [2005] ABCA 437, at
para. 32 (Alta. C.A.); Waters v. Donnelly, [1884] O.J. No. 294, 9 O.R. 391, at para. 59 (Ont.
H.C.J.); Downer v. Pitcher, [2017] N.J. No. 64, [2017] NLCA 13, at paras. 44-49 (N.L.C.A.);
Hart v. O’Connor, [1985] UKPC 17; Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, [1751] 2 Ves. Sen. 125,
at 155; Earl of Aylesford v. Morris, [1873] L.R. 8 Ch. App. 484, at 490-91; Ayres v.
Hazelgrove, unreported, 1984; Charles Rickett, “Unconscionability and Commercial Law”
(2005) 24 U.Q.L.J. 73, at 78.
76

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 84-85
(S.C.C.). For an expanded discussion of this and related developments, see Marcus Moore,
“The Doctrine of Contractual Absolution” (2022) 59:4 Alta. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
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Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 60,
85 (S.C.C.).
78
Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 60,
85 (S.C.C.).
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See note 75.
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Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 165
(S.C.C.).

16

DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTRACT LAW: THE 2020-2021 TERM – APPEALS TO FAIRNESS

“wholesale shift in the law”.81
Theoretically, this seems hard to dispute: while there had been debate about how
much knowledge was required, and whether unconscionability required a more
active form of exploitation than knowledge, there was little suggestion the doctrine
omitted at least a requirement of knowledge in some form.82 As there can be no
“inadvertent exploitation”, the dispensing of this requirement reestablishes the
Canadian doctrine of unconscionable bargains on a novel footing, outside the sphere
of exploitation inhabited by its sister doctrines found in other Commonwealth
jurisdictions.83
Meanwhile, practical implications of the change include that parties will be at risk
of having contracts rescinded that the law agrees they had no reason to doubt the
validity of when they were made, and upon whose validity they have subsequently
relied.84 As was colourfully stated long ago, “to make inadequacy of consideration
of itself a distinct principle of relief in equity . . . Courts of Equity . . . would
throw everything into confusion and set afloat all the contracts of mankind.”85
Indeed, a party that knows it is impaired could enter a contract, see how things go,
and later get a court to cancel it, despite the innocent reliance of its contracting
partner. That seems unfair.86 For the reason just discussed, parties may even be
incentivized to conceal impairments. If so, it will increase the frequency with which
these problematic — indeed unconscionable — contracts will be made, and
unpredictably, rescinded.
In short, as a vitiating doctrine, unconscionable bargains is best suited to play a
vital but limited role in protecting fairness in contracts. To greatly expand its scope
of application, as happened in Uber, is worrisome on account of its detrimental
impact on stability of contract. Freedom of contract often must be abridged for the
sake of fairness. Certainty also frequently gives way to other considerations, which
81

Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 167
(S.C.C.).
82
Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and Restitution (Toronto:
LexisNexis, 2014), at 544. McInnes cites Marshall v. Canada Permanent Trust Co., [1968]
A.J. No. 81, 69 D.L.R. (2d) 260 (Alta. S.C.) as one of the few cases possibly suggesting
otherwise.
83

See, e.g., Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections on the Canadian Unconscionability
Doctrine” (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 171.
84
As noted by Brown J.: Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020]
SCC 16, at paras 166-167 (S.C.C.).
85

Griffıth v. Spratley (1787), 1 Cox. Eq. Cas. 383, at 388, 29 E.R. 1213, at 1215.

86

See, e.g., Peter Birks & Catherine Mitchell, “Unjust Enrichment” in Peter Birks, ed.,
English Private Law (Oxford: Oxford, 2000); Rick Bigwood, “Antipodean Reflections on the
Canadian Unconscionability Doctrine” (2005) 84 Can. Bar Rev. 171; Rick Bigwood,
Exploitative Contracts (Oxford: Oxford, 2004).
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overall is manageable because departures from the parties’ reasonable expectations
are limited. But stability of contract cannot routinely be put in question. What good
to parties are contracts, if they might often, and unpredictably, be found unenforceable? What use is Contract Law if it fails to establish conditions allowing parties to
know when contracts they make will be enforced, and to plan accordingly? As
suggested earlier, regulations with a more measured effect are better suited than
vitiating doctrines to the routine protection of fairness in contracts.87
3. Public Policy
As mentioned above, Brown J. preferred to address the fairness of the arbitration
clause in Uber not under unconscionability but as a matter of public policy.88 The
doctrine of public policy, he submitted, is “fundamental” to Canadian Contract
Law.89 Thus, although the parties had not argued it in the appeal, courts will
consider public policy of their own motion.90 While parties generally enjoy freedom
of contract, there are limits on what they can bind themselves to; in such cases,
freedom of contract is overridden by public policy.91 Courts can decline to enforce
contractual provisions that are contrary to public policy.92
Dealing with the fairness of the arbitration clause using the doctrine of public
policy has contrasting effects in terms of how broad or narrow an approach it
represents to regulating the fairness of contracts. On one hand, as Côté J. argued,
public policy is vague and open-ended as a ground of exception to the general rule
of contract enforcement.93 Justice Brown having criticized the majority’s approach
as harming stability of contract, he was keen to emphasize that courts have
cautioned against expanding the doctrine of public policy, that its existing
applications are well established, and that his reasons in Uber were a straightforward
application of existing law.94 Whether public policy is itself circumscribed as an
87

See notes 7 and 72.
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Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at paras. 101,
106 (S.C.C.).
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Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, 2020 SCC 16, at para. 109
(S.C.C.), quoting Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways),
[2010] S.C.J. No. 4, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69, at para. 116 (S.C.C.) (Binnie J.).
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Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 106
(S.C.C.), citing Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., [2006] S.C.J. No. 52, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 612,
at para. 59 (S.C.C.).
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(S.C.C.), citing Millar Estate (Re), [1938] S.C.J. No. 41, [1938] S.C.R. 1, at 4 (S.C.C.).
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(S.C.C.).
93
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exception to the rule of contractual enforcement may be doubted: on another
occasion, the Court remarked that public policy was “memorably described as an
unruly horse”.95 That said, in my view Brown J. was correct in noting that in the
contexts where it does apply, it tends to furnish a “narrowly framed solution”.96
Take for example the issue of unfair terms in standard form contracts, discussed
earlier. An approach based on public policy may be confined to specific types of
clause. For example, previously, the Court had dealt in this way with exemption
clauses in Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and
Highways), and forum selection clauses in Douez v. Facebook Inc.; in Uber, Brown
J. applied it to the arbitration clause, and the majority saw part of that clause’s
unfairness as its incorporation of a foreign choice of law provision.97 Even if one
takes these instances as jointly embodying a common principle, the principle could
be drawn narrowly as a concern with impeding access to justice — which is indeed
how Brown J. describes the principle upon which he relied (as detailed below). This
framing corresponds with a special focus, in Margaret Radin’s recent work, on those
standard form terms whose effect is to impede access to justice.98 But terms which
have that effect represent only a narrow subset of the term-types typically covered
by legislative and judicial controls addressing unfair standard form terms outside of
Canadian common law.99 Presumably, a reason Abella J. argued in Douez v.
Facebook Inc. and a unanimous Court signalled in TELUS Communications Inc. v.
Wellman that it would move towards relying on unconscionability to control unfair
terms100 — as the majority then did in Uber101 — was to have a more general
fairness control for standard form terms, consistent with the more general approach
137 (S.C.C), citing Millar Estate (Re), [1938] S.C.J. No. 41, [1938] S.C.R. 1, at 4-7 (S.C.C.)
(see B. Kain & D.T. Yoshida, “The Doctrine of Public Policy in Canadian Contract Law” in
T.L. Archibald & R.S. Echlin, eds., Annual Review of Civil Litigation 2007 (2007) 1, at 17
and fn. 85).
95

Tercon Contractors Ltd. v. British Columbia (Transportation and Highways), [2010]
S.C.J. No. 4, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 69, at para. 116 (S.C.C.).
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Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020] SCC 16, at para. 109
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[2017] 1 S.C.R. 751 (S.C.C.); Uber Technologies Inc. v. Heller, [2020] S.C.J. No. 16, [2020]
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typical in other jurisdictions. By contrast, Brown J.’s approach of dealing with
unfairness discretely clause-type by clause-type through a series of specific
applications of public policy, is a narrower approach than unconscionability (as it
also was precedingly in Douez v. Facebook Inc. and Tercon Contractors Ltd. v.
British Columbia (Transportation and Highways)).
The previous paragraph alluded to the public policy principle upon which Brown
J. based his approach in Uber. In arriving at that principle, he started by asserting
that the right to a legal recourse is “inalienable even by the concurrent will of the
parties”.102 Unless one could enforce one’s contractual rights, a contract was
self-evidently of no value.103 To protect the integrity of the legal system and the
market, public policy therefore will not enforce terms which bar access to
dispute-resolution according to law.104 To enforce such terms would enable the
denial of access to justice, which would in turn violate the rule of law.105
Although at times the principles were stated in terms of court access, after
reviewing the history of the movement toward acceptance of arbitration, Brown J.
confirmed that alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) mechanisms may qualify,
provided they afford a comparable measure of justice.106 This was the case for
arbitration under legislation that provides for a legally determined outcome, fair and
equal treatment of parties, and court oversight.107
While the contract in Uber did not purport to exclude access to civil justice, that
was its effect, and there was no reason to distinguish between these.108 Specifically,
the issue in Brown J.’s view — and the crux of his disagreement with Côté J. — was
applicable to these with the unconscionable bargains doctrine dealing with different
situations.
102
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that he saw the arbitration clause in the case as in practice operating not to provide
for arbitration but to preclude it; as he wrote, “a measure intended to enhance access
to justice is now to be used as a tool for cutting off access to justice. That cannot be
right.”109
The reason the clause had the effect of barring access to justice was because it
required an upfront fee that was substantial in proportion to the plaintiff driver’s
annual earnings under the contract, and grossly disproportionate to the amount of
any dispute reasonably likely under it.110 Analogously to the court fees ruled an
unconstitutional barrier to access to justice in Trial Lawyers Assn. of British
Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the arbitration fees in Uber were
such a deterrent to initiating proceedings as to be indistinguishable from precluding
access altogether.111 On this point, Brown J. noted that “during the hearing of this
appeal, Uber’s counsel would not concede that a clause requiring an upfront
payment of 10 billion dollars to commence a civil claim would necessarily be
equivalent to a brick wall standing in the way of dispute resolution.”112 This defiant
stance surely boosted the plaintiff in respect of the outcome, by rendering the
difficult question of at what point costs become a barrier irrelevant to Uber’s
position.113
To offer some general guidance, useful in other contexts regarding the question of
when costs become an unfair barrier, Brown J drew again on Trial Lawyers Assn. of
British Columbia v. British Columbia (Attorney General) to suggest that the test
would be whether the clause at issue would cause undue hardship for the party
wishing to bring a claim.114 Further, he elaborated factors to consider in assessing
whether undue hardship is caused. These include: (1) whether the cost to pursue a
claim is disproportionate to the value of disputes likely to arise under the contract;
(2) whether there is compensation elsewhere in the contract for a term which
discourages access to low-value claims; (3) whether there was a disparity in
109
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bargaining power between the parties; (4) whether the clause in issue is an
unnegotiated standard form clause; (5) whether the restrictions on access are tailored
to limit or offset prejudicial effects.115
While these factors were seen to clearly line up behind the conclusion that the
clause in Uber was contrary to public policy, the analysis called for is complex and
its outcome harder to predict in less extreme cases. Elsewhere in his reasons, Brown
J. supported the view that certainty is important with regard to the validity of
arbitration clauses.116 He submitted that his approach furthers certainty because it
only applies where the arbitration provided for is “arguably inaccessible”.117 One
might question this, however: after all, the test is not inaccessibility, but hardship.
Precisely when hardship becomes undue, considering multiple factors, is not so
obviously certain. Further, Brown J. allowed that arbitration may justifiably require
significant upfront costs, where warranted based on the context.118 Thus, even
where it is accepted that a clause creates significant impediments on access, a careful
contextual analysis may reveal that this hardship is not undue. At least in standard
form contracts, greater certainty might be achieved by a bright-line rule that
arbitration clauses are unenforceable. The provision along these lines for consumer
contracts in Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act reflects concerns of inequality of
bargaining power and information.119 Taking this further, standard form terms are
not bargained and typically not even known. Dealing in this way with standard form
contracts would leave far fewer contracts in need of the more complex, less
predictable analysis above. And presumably, in the remaining cases consisting of
negotiated contracts, rarely would courts find arbitration clauses (including ones
carrying significant upfront fees) unenforceable. Such an approach would be more
conducive to certainty and better reflect contracting parties’ reasonable expectations
in each situation.
As to the remedy for a violation of public policy, Brown J. held that the only
appropriate remedy is to find the clause unenforceable.120 In particular, he rejected
Côté J.’s suggestion of blue pencil severance, noting that this is only permitted
where excising the illegal portion of the clause would not alter the meaning of the
115
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portion left over, or distort the original intentions of the parties.121 In this case, he
argued that it was the total effect of the clause that made it illegal, and moreover the
intention was illegal in that it was to dissuade the very claims likely to arise under
the agreement.122
This completes the section of this article dealing with issues of fairness related to
the making of contracts. I now turn to fairness issues in the performance of
contracts.
III. FAIRNESS

IN THE

PERFORMANCE

OF

CONTRACTS

Playing a central role in supervising fairness in contractual performance is good
faith. During the 2020-2021 period, the Supreme Court released some prominent
decisions dealing with good faith. The good faith duty of honest performance was
clarified in C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger.123 Shortly thereafter, the meaning and
contours of the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith were elaborated
by the SCC for the first time in Wastech Services Ltd. v. Greater Vancouver
Sewerage and Drainage District.124 A third case in which good faith was raised,
Matthews v. Ocean Nutrition Canada Ltd., is principally of significance to
Employment Law, and is not discussed in detail in this article.125 With respect to the
Law of Contract, I would simply note that the Court held in Matthews that the duty
to provide reasonable notice of dismissal is not in itself a matter of good faith, but
a free-standing duty. Good faith’s relevance was on the manner of dismissal, for
example, if done in a callous or insensitive way that would foreseeably cause harm,
in which case there could be separate damages on that basis.126
1. Good Faith
The aforementioned SCC judgments in the 2020-2021 term dealt with good faith
in the common law context, where good faith was fairly recently substantially
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reorganized in in Bhasin v. Hrynew.127 The Court’s unanimous decision in Bhasin
continues to provide the overarching framework for good faith in Canadian common
law. As a major component of judicial supervision of fairness in the performance of
contracts, I now explain aspects of that superstructure relevant to the particular
developments that occurred in the term reviewed here.
Bhasin accepted “that there is an organizing principle of good faith that underlies
and manifests itself in various more specific doctrines governing contractual
performance”.128 Good faith is therefore not itself a doctrine or rule of direct
application, but a broader principle that animates specific doctrines applicable in
different contexts. As Cromwell J. explained, good faith “is not a free-standing rule,
but rather a standard that underpins . . . more specific legal doctrines . . . in
different situations . . . Good faith may be invoked in widely varying contexts and
this calls for a highly context-specific understanding”.129 As an underlying
principle, the role of good faith in Canadian common law, then, is that it “states in
general terms a requirement of justice from which more specific legal doctrines may
be derived”.130 Specifically, it “exemplifies the notion that, in carrying out [one’s]
own performance of the contract, a contracting party should have appropriate regard
to the legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner”.131 Fairness in this
sense was distinguished from the fiduciary principle through the observation that
good faith “does not require acting to serve . . . interests” of the counterpart in
every case; “it merely requires that a party not seek to undermine those interests in
bad faith . . . Unlike fiduciary duties, good faith performance does not engage
duties of loyalty . . . or a duty to put the interests of the other contracting party
first.”132 The difference between good faith and bad faith was explained by the
observation that “parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly
and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily”.133 It therefore serves to help
ensure that parties adhere to a basic standard of fairness in contractual performance.
Underpinned by this organizing principle of good faith, Bhasin recognized four
actual doctrines applicable to contracts generally: a duty of cooperation to achieve
the objects of a contract; a duty to exercise discretionary powers under a contract in
good faith; a duty not to evade one’s contractual duties; and a duty of honest
127
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performance.134 The possibility of recognizing additional rules in the future,
applicable to contracts generally, was also left open for situations where “the
existing law is found to be wanting and where the development may occur
incrementally in a way that is consistent with the structure of the common law of
contract and giv[ing] due weight to the importance of private ordering and certainty
in commercial affairs”.135 Bhasin also acknowledged the existence of duties of good
faith in special classes of contractual relation, in particular employment, insurance
and tendering.136
The framework for good faith in Canadian common law set out in Bhasin, then,
was the background for the Court’s decisions in Callow, rendered in December
2020, and Wastech, rendered in February 2021.
(a) The Good Faith Duty of Honest Performance
Callow concerned the termination of a commercial services contract allegedly in
bad faith. Callow was under contract to the Baycrest condominium complex to
provide maintenance services. Callow wished to procure a renewal for a further
term, and discussions were held about this during which Baycrest actively misled
Callow that this was likely and Callow provided free extra services in hopes of
sealing the deal.137 In fact, several months prior to this, Baycrest had become
unhappy with the services and had decided to terminate the existing contract early,
under a clause which allowed it do so on 10 days’ notice. But awaiting a more
opportune time to provide the notice, it withheld this information for many months
while deceiving Callow about the latter’s standing. As a result of the deception,
Callow had lost the opportunity to bid on other work for the period after the contract
with Baycrest was terminated, and had incurred expenses for maintenance equipment needed for the work expected to be performed for Baycrest during that period.
Justice Kasirer, writing for a five-justice majority, and Brown J., in a concurring
opinion representing three justices, both held that Baycrest’s conduct breached the
good faith duty of honest performance. Justice Côté dissented, objecting to the trial
judge’s finding that Baycrest actively misled Callow.
Although the majority and concurring opinions in Callow agreed that the dispute
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could be resolved on the basis of the law as already established in Bhasin,138 an
opportunity was seen to exist to clarify certain points pertaining to the duty of honest
performance.139 This duty serves to protect parties against being unfairly deceived
or misled by their contracting partner about the performance of their contract.
Unlike in Bhasin, there were no outright lies in Callow. Thus, it was confirmed (as
already stated in Bhasin) that other forms of conduct that actively mislead or deceive
a contracting partner qualify as dishonesty for purposes of the duty.140 What all
counts as actively misleading or deceiving could not be comprehensively stated in
the abstract, as it is a “highly fact-specific determination”.141 However, the
deception must be done knowingly, and may include half-truths, omissions, and
even silence where communication is necessary to correct a misapprehension by the
other party caused by one’s own prior misleading conduct.142 Beyond this, it was
affirmed as earlier stated in Bhasin that the duty of honesty should not be taken to
impose a general duty of disclosure.143 Justice Côté expressed concern that the
distinction between conduct that is actively misleading versus permissible nondisclosure was “far from” clear, and argued that parties’ interests in contractual
certainty called for a duty of honesty that is clear and easy to apply.144 To that end,
Brown J. suggested that courts use the well-established jurisprudence on misrepresentation in drawing the same distinction. In his opinion, the standard for when
communication is necessary to correct a counterpart’s misapprehension is when the
party’s own conduct contributed to that misapprehension; Côté J. favoured an
apparently higher standard of materially contributing to the misapprehension.145
Although Bhasin concerned dishonesty in relation to a contractual right (a right
of renewal), the duty of honesty had been described there as in relation to
contractual obligations. Hence, Kasirer J. also clarified in Callow that the duty
138
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equally applies to contractual rights (in this case, a right to terminate).146
A related concern for the Court in Callow was to clarify the necessary link
between the dishonesty and performance of the contract, under the duty. On this, the
Court emphasized that the dishonesty and the performance must be “directly
linked”.147 Here, Baycrest misled Callow into believing that the contract would be
renewed, and Callow inferred from this that the existing contract would not be
terminated. The justices seem not to have treated this inference as encompassed by
the requirement of a direct link between the dishonesty and the exercise of the
termination clause; however, because Callow’s inference was reasonable, it then fell
upon Baycrest to correct it — failing which its silence was dishonesty that did bear
directly on its exercise of the termination clause.148
The above clarifications of the duty of honesty pursued by the SCC in Callow also
spoke to questions about its scope and limits: the border between fair non-disclosure
and unfair silence that actively misleads; and the requirement that the dishonesty be
directly linked to exercise of a right or performance of an obligation under the
contract.149 In the absence of such limits, as Kasirer J. acknowledged, “there would
simply be a duty not to tell a lie, with little to limit the potentially wide scope of
liability”.150
The proper measure of damages for breach of the duty of honesty was disputed
between the majority and concurring opinions. Justice Kasirer held that breach of
the duty of honest performance gives rise to damages according to the usual
contractual measure of expectancy damages. These put the innocent party in the
position it would have been in had the contract been performed without being
breached — in such cases by breaching the duty of honesty imposed by the common
law.151 Justice Brown, on the other hand, submitted that the damages to be awarded
are reliance damages compensating the innocent party for loss it suffered as a result
of detrimental reliance on the wrongful party’s dishonest representations about its
146
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performance. This followed from Brown J.’s conceptualization of the dishonesty not
as a defect in contractual performance but as an extra-contractual misrepresentation
concerning its performance.152 The two justices agreed that in many cases the
damages would be the same by either measure.153 Justice Kasirer further conceded
that there could be cases in which reliance damages would be necessary or
preferable, for example, in cases “where it would be difficult for the plaintiff to
prove the position they would have been in had the contract been performed”.154
According to Brown J., in Bhasin itself, although what were spoken of were
expectancy damages, what were actually awarded were reliance damages: the
contract was fully performed and concluded. An expectancy interest in its renewal
was rejected by the Court, with Cromwell J. explaining that “it is a considerable
stretch, as I see it, to turn even a broadly conceived duty of good faith exercise of
the non-renewal provision into what is, in effect, a contract of indefinite duration.”155 The Bhasin Court noted the unfairness of this manner of contractual
performance, in that were it not for the dishonesty, the innocent party “would have
been able to retain the value of his business rather than see it, in effect,
expropriated”; thus, it awarded damages for the lost value of the business.156 It
might be added that this also appears to be what the majority actually did in Callow:
the “expectation” damages awarded were from a hypothetical contract with a third
party, representing Callow’s “lost opportunity” to procure such a contract as a result
of its reliance on the dishonest statements by Baycrest.157 Given Callow’s
affirmation of Bhasin’s position that breach of the duty of honesty in relation to the
date of renewal or termination does not allow a court to treat the contract as if its
term were extended beyond its point of termination according to the terms the
contract provides, it is difficult to see how such cases could be compensated by
expectancy damages. A meaningful damage award, commensurate with the foreseeable consequences of the breach, would be reliance damages based on the
deception unfairly causing a lost opportunity of a contract with some other party.
Presumably, for the Court to give effect rather to expectancy damages, it would have
to treat the contract indeed as if its term was extended — that the dishonesty created
152
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such an expectation, notwithstanding what the contract otherwise provided regarding termination.
In Callow, the Court also considered the relationship between the duty of honesty
and the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith. Justice Kasirer cast them
as closely connected, explaining that both concern the unfair exercise of a
“contractual prerogative”.158 To explain this, he drew on the civilian doctrine of
abuse of right, which provides that no right can be exercised in an abusive
manner.159 Accordingly, he noted, “it is no answer to say that, because a right is
unfettered on its face, it is insulated from review as to the manner in which it was
exercised.”160 Hence, although a contractual right may be drafted in a way that
depicts it as absolute, it is still constrained by the duty to exercise it honestly. The
duty of honesty fulfils a “limiting function” on how rights may be exercised,
subjecting them to a basic standard of fairness that they be exercised honestly.161
Justice Brown disagreed that the duty of honesty concerns the manner in which
rights are exercised, describing it rather as consisting in dishonest representations
about contractual performance.162 He observed that in the case at bar, for instance,
the dishonesty occurred at a time prior to the exercise of the termination clause.163
In his view, what was to be emphasized was not a connection between the duty of
honesty and the duty to exercise discretionary powers in good faith, but their
distinction.164 He noted that the duty of honesty may arise in other contexts not
involving the manner of a right’s exercise.165
Of this debate, it seems to me that at least in cases where the dishonesty lies (no
pun intended) in representations about one’s performance, the view of Brown J. is
preferable. Consider the situation where a party misrepresents its performance to its
counterpart. For example, suppose a water leak damages premises. Anxious to have
remediation completed as soon as possible so it can move onto repairs, thus enabling
158

C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, [2020] S.C.J. No. 45, [2020] SCC 45, at para. 51
(S.C.C.).
159

Civil Code of Québec, CCQ-1991, art. 7.

160

C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, [2020] S.C.J. No. 45, [2020] SCC 45, at para. 68
(S.C.C.).
161

C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, [2020] S.C.J. No. 45, [2020] SCC 45, at para. 68
(S.C.C.).
162
C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, [2020] S.C.J. No. 45, [2020] SCC 45, at para. 177
(S.C.C.).
163
C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, [2020] S.C.J. No. 45, [2020] SCC 45, at para. 177
(S.C.C.).
164

C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, [2020] S.C.J. No. 45, [2020] SCC 45, at paras. 176-181
(S.C.C.).
165

C.M. Callow Inc. v. Zollinger, [2020] S.C.J. No. 45, [2020] SCC 45, at para. 179
(S.C.C.).

29

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

the tenant to return, the insurer regularly asks for updates from the remediator.
Anxious to get more work from the insurer by completing the work quickly, and
thinking it unlikely that there is mould, the remediator replies that remediation is
completed of water damage in the flooring and walls, and that only the fixtures
remain. The insurer then proceeds with the repairs to the walls and floor, and advises
the tenant that they can return. But the samples that the remediator had sent off for
mould testing at the outset then come back positive. The remediator tells the insurer
that there is mould, and that sections of the underflooring and walls will need to be
removed. As a result, the newly refinished walls and floor will need to be cut out and
redone. It seems odd to describe the situation as that the remediator’s contractual
obligation — to remediate the floor and walls — was performed in a dishonest
manner. One could perhaps conceive of there being an implied term granting the
remediator a right to choose what updates to give the insurer prior to completing its
work, and hold this implied term to have been exercised dishonestly. Indeed, one
could say in every case that there is an implied term granting a party the right
(except as otherwise specified by the written contract) to choose what representations to make regarding its performance, and say that the duty of dishonesty
therefore concerns the manner in which that right is exercised. But Bhasin held that
the duty of honesty did not depend on an implied term; it was a rule of the common
law.166 Either way, this is a convoluted and unintuitive way of describing the
unfairness.
There may be concern not to be seen as imposing obligations on the parties
outside the terms of their contract. But this is what Contract Law normally does
where it is regulating in any respect parties’ performance of contracts. For example,
the parties’ agreement may say nothing of the consequences of breach. But the
common law imposes a secondary obligation on a party found to be in breach to
remedy the breach, by paying expectancy damages or what other remedy the court
may order. The same is true of the obligation to compensate the innocent party for
consequential loss according to the principle in Hadley v. Baxendale. The parties’
agreement also may say nothing of frustration. But if the conditions for that
doctrine’s application are met, even if the parties specified what damages would be
paid in the event of breach, the party that did not receive the performance it was
promised may be obliged to forego those damages. Hence, concern about imposing
obligations not chosen by the parties would not seem to provide a compelling reason
for casting the duty of honesty as a wrongful exercise of a contractual right.
Relatedly, this way of depicting it might reflect concern about ensuring an
ascertainable scope to the duty of honesty’s expansion of potential contractual
liability. Characterizing it as contained within the rights and obligations agreed and
established by the contract gives it the appearance of being bounded — merely a
matter of how the already established rights are exercised and obligations discharged. But substantively, characterizing the duty this way does not make it any
166
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more circumscribed; meanwhile, the artificiality of this representation of it makes
the duty’s scope (and application) more uncertain. It seems more straightforward
just to say that the dishonesty must be about contractual performance. This suffices
to convey the point that dishonesty about other matters, or in general, is not covered
by the duty — that it does not amount simply to a “duty not to lie”.
Further delimiting the scope of the duty of honesty does not depend on whether
the dishonesty is framed as “in the exercise of” or as “about” a contractual
performance. A way of further delimiting its scope — and using an approach typical
of Contract Law (indeed an approach recently relied on by the SCC in a very
different context, in Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary
Cathedral v. Aga167) — would be to focus on the intent to be legally bound.168 The
question would then be: was it reasonable for the receiver of the statement to
interpret it as one the maker would intend that the recipient could legally rely on?
This question would also be asked in the case of misrepresentation. Here, there is a
potential problem in that Bhasin had said that “breach of the duty of honest
contractual performance does not require the defendant to intend that the false
statement be relied on”.169 The meaning of this statement from Bhasin is not entirely
clear. If it means that the representor need not intend that the false statement could
be relied on, then this would conflict with the suggestion above that the intention to
be legally bound play a role in delimiting the duty. However, it would be surprising
if that were the meaning. One would expect, for instance, that a false statement that
is obviously a “puff” or said in jest would not breach the duty of honesty. A better
reading of the statement (and perhaps the more grammatical one) is that it means
that the representor need not intend that the false statement should be relied on. In
that case, it makes sense in referring to the inducement element of misrepresentation
that is not required of conduct which breaches the duty of honesty.170
Given that Brown J. disagreed that the duty of honest performance concerns the
manner in which a right is exercised, it is hardly surprising that he further objected
to the recourse made by Kasirer J. to the civilian concept of abuse of right.171 The
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present article on developments in Contract Law is not the place to discuss these
broader “methodological” questions on use of comparative law or of crossfertilization between Canada’s two systems of private law. However, it is possible
to address the more limited question of the utility of the reference made to the
doctrine of abuse of right in Quebec in illuminating the common law’s good faith
duty of honesty. As I hold a civil law degree besides a common law degree, and have
a comparative law formation as an alumnus of McGill’s trans-systemic law program,
it may be that I am not among the group of “unijural” common lawyers Brown J.
had in mind for whom he felt the reference to Quebec law was least useful.172 Still,
for the reasons stated above, I did not find the reference helpful in clarifying the duty
of honesty. That said, I did find it helpful in relation to the duty to exercise discretion
in good faith. Breach of that good faith duty had been argued as an alternative claim
in Callow,173 and thus was part of the record. Also, that good faith duty was at issue
in the Wastech case that was under reserve concurrently with Callow, and whose
release would shortly follow it. Thus, the discussion of abuse of right in Callow
likely had, in part, these factors in mind. Indeed, the civilian doctrine of abuse of
right was discussed again in Wastech by Kasirer J., writing there too for the majority.
In that case, he seemed to suggest that it was superfluous, as the duty to exercise
contractual discretion in good faith was already “uncontroversial[ly]” conceptualized in common law jurisdictions as an abuse of a right (the right to exercise the
discretion).174 However, I found the references useful with regard to the duty to
exercise discretion in good faith in supporting the more specific — and contentious
— claim (disputed by the concurring justices in Wastech) that even a discretion
which is cast as absolute is still subject to limitations if abused in bad faith. The civil
law-backed argument in Callow that any right (including ones not consisting in
exercise of discretion) can be unfairly exercised served to lay or soften the ground
in advance for the subsequent claim in Wastech that a discretion billed as unfettered
is in fact subject to limitations and can be unfairly exercised.175 In terms of
non-discretionary rights, one general example would be taking advantage of
necessitous circumstances of a counterpart to extort a modification.176
This brings me to the proposition in Callow and Bhasin that damages are to be
measured by comparison to the “least onerous” means of good faith performance by
172
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the party in breach.177 This common law rule applies where there is a contractual
prerogative — that is, where the contract provides a party “alternative ways of
performing a contract at his option”.178 Above, it was argued that breach of the duty
of honesty is not best understood as necessarily consisting in misuse of a contractual
prerogative. From this suggestion, it follows that the rule of measuring damages by
comparison to the least onerous means of good faith performance is not always
relevant to the duty of honesty. Callow is an example of where this rule is of dubious
application. Justice Kasirer reasoned that “[w]hile damages are to be measured
against a defendant’s least onerous means of performance, the least onerous means
of performance in this case would have been to correct the misrepresentation once
Baycrest knew Callow had drawn a false inference.”179 The position of Brown J.
was similar.180 However, the defendant correcting a misapprehension that it caused
through dishonesty is not a less onerous means of honest performance. By then, the
duty of honesty has already been breached. What Kasirer J. and Brown J. reference
is simply a way in which the defendant could have mitigated its liability by making
it unreasonable for the plaintiff to continue to rely on the prior dishonest
representation. Justice Kasirer observes that had Baycrest made the correction,
“Callow would have had the opportunity to secure another contract for the
upcoming winter.”181 But suppose, for example, that the industry was characterized
by a short window of time in which maintenance contracts for the following season
are bid on and awarded. It may not have reduced Callow’s loss if Baycrest had
corrected its deception quickly, but the window of opportunity was already
closed.182 Surely, Baycrest would still be liable for the full damages of Callow’s
unfairly lost opportunity.183
It seems to me that the question of the least onerous means of performance is only
relevant under two cumulative conditions. First, the breach of the duty of honesty
must have been one that gives rise to expectancy damages. In cases like Bhasin and
177
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Callow where the breach gives rise rather to reliance damages, the damages are
simply the loss unfairly caused to the innocent party in relying to its detriment on
the dishonest representation. It is irrelevant what the least onerous means of honest
performance was. Second, the contract had to be one where, as mentioned above, the
“defendant ha[d] alternative ways of performing a contract at his option”. In such
cases, the rule is needed in order to determine which of them supplies the benchmark
for measuring the expectancy against which the defendant’s performance fell short.
The classic discussion is that of Scrutton L.J. in Withers v. General Theatre Corp.184
He gives two examples: (1) where a seller had an option to supply 800 to 1,200 tons
of a certain commodity — in this case, the damages will be measured by the
difference between his performance versus if he supplied 800 tons; and (2) where
the landlord who could determine a lease after seven, 14, or 21 years wrongfully
terminated it after five years — the damages assume the tenant had only two more
years of the lease to run.185 Thus, in Bhasin, had the Court awarded expectancy
damages, this rule would have dictated that the damages be based on the agreement
ending at the three-year point, which would have resulted in no damages. In Callow,
it would have been based on the agreement ending in 10 days, again resulting in no
damages.
Next I turn to the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith, elaborated
in Wastech.
(b) The Duty to Exercise Discretion in Good Faith
The dispute in Wastech centred around whether a discretionary power in a
long-term contract had been exercised in bad faith. The corporation responsible for
waste disposal in Metro Vancouver (“Metro”) had a 20-year contract with Wastech
for waste hauling and disposal. By its terms, Wastech would be paid at different rates
depending on the volumes of waste sent to different disposal sites. The contract
provided that the allocation among the disposal sites was at Metro’s discretion.
Wastech had limited protection through provisions for adjustments in certain events,
such as compensation for small departures from a target annual profit margin, and
prospective adjustments in case of larger or more sustained deviations.186 Notably,
the contract did not guarantee Wastech its annual target profit margin,187 and the
parties had considered but failed to agree an additional mechanism that would
provide compensation for the impact of a large variance in one year’s waste
allocation.188 In 2011, a sharp reallocation of waste flows by Metro caused Wastech
184
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to fall well short of its target annual profit margin.189 Wastech argued that Metro
used its discretion unfairly to the prejudice of Wastech’s legitimate interests under
the contract.
Unanimously, the Supreme Court held that Metro’s exercise of its discretion over
the waste allocation was not in bad faith. Justice Kasirer again authored the majority
judgment, for six justices. Brown and Rowe JJ. (Côté J. concurring) agreed in the
result. However, they excepted to the treatment by Kasirer J. of certain issues,
including the scope of the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith, and
the relative authority of the terms of the contract in establishing the standard
according to which a breach of that duty should be assessed.
The existence of a duty to exercise contractual discretionary powers in good faith
had been recognized earlier in Bhasin.190 However, prior to Wastech, the meaning
and content of that duty had yet to be elaborated.191 The overarching significance of
the Supreme Court’s judgment in Wastech is in fleshing out the essential features of
what that duty requires in terms of fair treatment of one’s contracting partner.
Elaborating the meaning and content of the duty to exercise contractual discretion
in good faith firstly required settling on a basis for assessing what fairness in this
context required. Prior to Wastech, this was unclear.192 For example, there was
authority for the proposition that the discretion had to be exercised reasonably.193
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189
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However, the meaning of reasonableness in this context was itself undetermined.194
Meanwhile, there was also precedent that the duty called for the discretion not to be
exercised “arbitrarily or capriciously”.195 Some support existed for the claim that
the discretion had to be exercised “honestly” — including as part of the case history
in Wastech, in the approach of the arbitrator.196 Another common take on the duty
was that it meant that the holder of the discretion was to be restrained from
exercising it for an improper purpose.197 In a different vein, a number of cases had
held that a contractual discretionary power is exercised in bad faith where it is used
to nullify the benefit of the bargain for the other party.198 Also, the duty had been
said to target abuse of contractual discretion “contrary to community standards” of
fairness.199
Faced with this variety of ways of understanding the meaning of the duty to
exercise contractual discretion in good faith, the Supreme Court unanimously
234, at 258 (C.A.), per Priestley J.A.; A. Mason, “Contract, Good Faith and Equitable
Standards in Fair Dealing” (2000) 116 L.Q.R. 66, at 76; J.D. McCamus, “Abuse of
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Good Faith Contractual Performance” (2005) 29 Adv. Q. 72, at 80; John McCamus, The Law
of Contracts, 3d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2020), at 937; J.M. Paterson, “Good Faith Duties
in Contract Performance” (2014) 14 O.U.C.L.J. 283, at 284, 299 and 302; A. Gray,
“Development of Good Faith in Canada, Australia and Great Britain” (2015) 57 Can. Bus.
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endorsed the improper purpose conception.200
In arriving at this conclusion, Kasirer J. explained that nullification of a benefit
describes a result, and does not in itself speak to whether that result was necessarily
caused by action that was in breach of the duty to exercise contractual discretion in
good faith — or of any other contractual duty.201 Hence, this was not the measure
of breach of the duty to exercise discretion in good faith, nor a prerequisite for
finding that the duty was breached.202 I add that the Court’s disfavour of that focus
appears consistent with its earlier move away from the doctrine of fundamental
breach, which was likewise focused on whether the plaintiff was substantially
deprived of the benefit of a bargain.203
The Court did not overtly respond to the “community standards” of fairness
theory of exercising discretion in good faith. However, a definite rejection of that
approach is perhaps implicit in Kasirer J.’s concern to avoid “ad hoc judicial
moralism”.204 More broadly, the Court emphasized that the duty “does not reflect
the imposition of external standards on the exercise of discretion, but rather giving
effect to the standards inherent in the parties’ own bargain.”205 And Kasirer J. added
that the duty — and the organizing principle of good faith more broadly — are
“anchored” by the notion of corrective justice,206 not by principles of distributive
justice such as what the court would find to be “morally opportune or wise . . . from
a business perspective”.207 The implicit rejection of the community standards of
fairness approach can be seen as consistent with the Court’s avoidance in Uber of
the “community standards of commercial morality” approach to unconscionability
200
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from Harry v. Kreutziger.208
On the need to exercise contractual discretion honestly, the Court seemed to take
the view that this was a matter for the duty of honest performance that was the good
faith doctrine at issue in Callow.209 A discretionary power, like any other contractual
right, was by that duty bound to be exercised honestly.210 The concurring opinion
read the majority as holding that courts should assess whether the duty of honesty
has been breached as a “preliminary step” to analyzing potential breach of the duty
to exercise discretion in good faith. Brown and Rowe JJ. objected to that
proposition, worried that it conflated the two duties.211 However, this is not my
reading of what the majority was saying: where in the passage complained of,
Kasirer J. had written “beyond the requirement of honest performance, to determine
whether a party failed in its duty to exercise discretionary power in good faith
. . .”,212 he probably did not intend to prescribe a sequential analysis of the two
duties. Instead, it is likely that he simply meant that it already having been discussed
that exercising a discretionary power dishonestly would breach the duty of honesty,
there are other ways a discretionary power could be exercised that will breach the
duty to exercise discretion in good faith. It is true that in his opinion, Kasirer J. did
first assess whether Metro breached the duty of honesty before assessing whether it
breached the duty to exercise discretion in good faith. However, this is readily
explained by the fact that the arbitrator had found Metro’s conduct to be
“dishonest”.213 If Kasirer J. had meant to direct courts to analyze the duties
sequentially, one would expect the judgment to have said so more plainly and
directly, as generally his opinion is clearly written and shows no hesitation to
underline points of potential significance.
As with the need to exercise discretion honestly, the Court in Wastech agreed that
good faith required that discretion be exercised in a way that is not arbitrary or
capricious.214 This implies that there must be some mode of exercising the
208
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discretion that would not be arbitrary or capricious. And that in turn suggests that
there existed some guidelines for the exercise of the discretion. In that regard, the
Court endorsed the view of the UKSC in British Telecommunications Plc. v.
Telefónica O2 UK Ltd. that the purpose of the discretion provides these guidelines:
Although capriciousness and arbitrariness have sometimes been referred to independently of improper purpose, I agree with the Supreme Court in Telefónica that
a capricious or arbitrary exercise of a discretionary power is an example of such a
power being exercised contrary to that standard. When seeking to demonstrate that
discretion was exercised capriciously or arbitrarily, one necessarily considers
contractual purposes by showing that discretion was exercised in a manner
unconnected to the underlying contractual purposes for which the power was
conferred.215

Thus, also citing the views of John McCamus, Hugh Collins, Lord Sales (writing
extrajudicially) and others, the majority decisively held the duty to exercise
contractual discretion in good faith to mean that the discretion be exercised
consistently with the purposes for which it was conferred.216 This was the
“touchstone” for assessing fairness in this context.217 The test is whether the
exercise of the discretion fell “outside the range of choices” connected to “the
purpose for which the contract granted discretion . . . If so, the party has not
exercised the contractual power in good faith.”218 The stated conceptualization of
the meaning and content of the duty is also consistent with the American position.219
And it was supported by the concurring opinion in Wastech: “we agree that the
purpose of a discretion is the proper focus of the good faith analysis.”220 That said,
likely in order to underscore that analogies should not be drawn to construction of
purpose in Public Law,221 Brown and Rowe JJ. preferred in lieu of the word
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“purpose” the phrase “shared reasonable expectation” of the parties.222 Moreover,
they suggested that one cannot always reliably interpret the purpose of a contractual
discretion (a point to be discussed further below).223
Having decided that the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith
meant that the holder of the discretion should not abuse it for an improper purpose,
it remained for the Court to specify how the purpose of a contractual discretionary
power should be ascertained. The Court explained that this was a matter of
interpreting the contract. Where the purpose emerged from applying the ordinary
principles of contractual interpretation, the majority and concurring opinions agreed
that this supplied the answer.224 But where the purpose is not evident from this, as
the discretion is simply cast as general, the majority held that the court itself must
ascertain the limits of the power. The majority presented this as still a matter of
construction: in those cases, “it is necessary . . . to form a broad view of the
purposes of the venture to which the contract gives effect, and of what loyalty to that
venture might involve for a party to it, and to take those broad purposes as providing
the inherent limits for the exercise of the power.”225 The concurring opinion
objected. In its view, this went beyond construction, and represented “the imposition, post facto, of a judicial view”. This, they said, distorted the bargain and
infringed on freedom of contract.226
The dispute among the opinions on this point can perhaps be illuminated by
looking by analogy at different elements of the law on terms implied-in-fact: The
guidance given by Kasirer J. can be compared with the business efficacy test for
terms implied-in-fact, wherein courts decide whether an obligation unmentioned by
Court’s New Rigorous Approach to Construction of Statutory Purpose” (2017) 77 S.C.L.R.
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the parties might be necessary to give effect to the purpose of the contract.227
Drawing this analogy is far from strained, as Kasirer J. himself observed that “on the
facts of this case, a duty on Metro to exercise its discretion in good faith”, had it not
been applicable as a general common law duty, would have been “necessary to give
business efficacy to the Contract”.228 And similarly to Kasirer J. characterizing the
majority’s approach to ascertaining the content of the duty as a matter of
construction, terms implied-in-fact under the business efficacy test are said to arise
from the “presumed intention of the parties”.229 The law presumes that the parties
intended that their agreement should be effective for the purposes for which they
created it, and if a term unexpressed by the parties is necessary to that, the court will
treat the term as implied. One assumes that Brown and Rowe JJ. accept this settled
position of the common law on terms implied-in-fact. Thus I wonder whether their
concern was perhaps misidentified in casting it as merely about construing broad
purposes tied to the objectives of a contract.230 Indeed, they themselves state that
where a contract “reflects a shared reasonable expectation as to the manner in which
a discretion may be exercised, that expectation will be enforced”.231 This is a
similarly broad assessment, and whether framed in reliance-terms as about the
parties’ expectations of the contract or in voluntarist-terms as about the parties’
contractual intentions, either way the judge is bound to draw inferences about what
the contract was to do, and how that relates to whether a certain exercise of
discretion was contemplated. This is reinforced by their later statement, this time
using the voluntarist language preferred by Kasirer J., that “the purpose of a
discretion is . . . defined by the parties’ intentions, as revealed by the contract”.232
Continuing with the implied terms analogy, a separate rule provides that a term
will not be implied if it conflicts with the express terms of the contract.233 In the
context of terms implied-in-fact, this rule protects against the concerns voiced by
Brown and Rowe JJ. about a court’s construction of a contract’s broad purposes and
associated presumption of party intention being permitted to distort a bargain or
227
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override freedom of contract. What Brown and Rowe JJ. seem keen to ensure is that
“where a contract discloses a clear intention to grant a discretion that can be
exercised for any purpose, courts . . . must give effect to that intention”, and
likewise that if parties “choose to specify the purpose for which a discretion has
been granted . . . their intention should be given effect and not subverted”.234 In my
view, what this calls for is a rule, like that constraining implication of terms, that no
limitation on a contractual discretion be held to exist that conflicts with a clear
intention by the parties to exclude such a limitation.235 As for the propriety of
construing the broad purposes of a contract, it is inevitable that there will be cases
in which it is this which shows that a certain limit on a discretion necessarily exists,
just the same as in implication it is often this which reveals the necessary existence
of an entirely unexpressed term. Indeed, it might be better to think of those limits
on a discretion ascertained by reference to the contract’s broad purposes as the result
of implication, as distinct from the limits ascertainable by straightforward interpretation. However, I will leave consideration of this proposition aside here, in order to
avoid causing confusion in light of Kasirer J. stating, on the separate issue of how
the duty to exercise discretion in good faith arises, that it is not an implied term but
a common law rule.236
A situation deserving of special attention is clauses which purport to confer
unfettered discretion. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, Brown and Rowe
JJ. submitted that courts must give effect to that. Indeed, they said further that “with
careful drafting, parties can largely immunize the exercise of discretion from
review” as to compliance with the duty to exercise discretion in good faith.237 By
contrast, the majority was of the view that “even unfettered, the discretionary power
will have purposes that reflects [sic] the parties’ shared interests and expectations,
which purposes help identify when an exercise is” unconnected to these and hence
breaches the duty.238 Justice Kasirer, citing Bhasin, Angela Swan et al. and Lord
Sales, went on to explain that:
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The referenced statement of Kasirer J. pertains to what he calls the “source” of the
duty, as distinct from the “content” of the duty, which as mentioned earlier, he said was to
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future to whether those cases in which he said the limits of a discretion cannot be determined
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it is difficult to imagine any party wishing to confer . . . untrammelled power on
its contracting partner. For this reason, when contracting parties confer a discretionary power, even without any apparent constraining criteria or conditions, courts
have long recognized that the “natural inference” is that they intend some minimum
constraints on the exercise of the discretion. . . those minimum constraints include
the expectation that the parties will not exercise their discretion in a manner
unconnected to the purposes for which it was granted, for example in a capricious
or arbitrary manner [references omitted].239

Thus, the majority reject the suggestion, implicit in the position of the concurring
opinion, that the purpose could simply be to confer an unfettered discretion. This
would be to license limitless unfairness, including maliciously motivated. On this
question of whether there could be a fully unfettered discretion, it is perhaps of note
that in Wastech itself, the contract had framed the power conferred on Metro
regarding waste allocation as “absolute discretion”.240 The majority, consistent with
its position just described, did not give effect to this; it said it needed to look further
at the contract as a whole, and concluded that the purpose was to allow Metro
flexibility to allocate waste in a way that would be efficient and minimize costs.241
Interestingly, Brown and Rowe JJ. seemed to agree: they took note of the contract’s
careful drafting,242 but did not argue that Metro’s exercise of its purportedly
“absolute” discretion should be immunized from review. Nor, in enumerating their
disagreements with the majority, did they include Kasirer J.’s construction of the
discretion held by Metro in the case.243 Indeed, similarly to Kasirer J., they held that
“the parties contemplated that Metro could exercise the discretion so as to advance
its own interests”, which were efficiency and least cost.244 Thus, in practice they did
not treat Metro’s “absolute discretion” as simply that, and beyond review.
On this issue of absolute discretion, it seems to me that the position espoused by
the majority in principle, also adhered to by the concurring justices in practice,
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reflects good sense. After all, a discretion is provided for a reason. As Ronald
Dworkin famously wrote: “Discretion, like the hole in a doughnut, does not exist
except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction ... It is therefore a
relative concept. It always makes sense to ask, ‘Discretion under which standards’.”
And as Todd Rakoff argues, to say the reason was to give one party absolute power
over the other is offensive to our fundamental value of equality.245 Indeed, to
suggest that this is the reason for a discretionary power only raises larger concerns
of possible unfair imposition — whether via standard form contracts, in which such
clauses are common246 — or circumstances such as duress, undue influence or
unconscionability. As Kasirer J. said, “it is difficult to imagine any party” in a
contracting process not afflicted by issues such as those just mentioned agreeing to
confer “untrammelled power” on its counterpart. Reading a clause in this sort of
literalist way is not consistent with the reasonable expectations of businesspeople.247 Nor does it reflect a correct application of the principles of contractual
interpretation.248 Assuming the discretion is created for some other reason, then,
that reason is — to use Brown and Rowe JJ.’s terms — what was “contemplated”
by the parties, and affects their “reasonable expectations”. Moreover, even if several
purposes are contemplated, it is unrealistic to suppose that the parties could have
contemplated every purpose conceivable, let alone approved of them all. As Collins
explains, good faith “enables a court to control discretionary decisions . . . where
the power is used for a purpose not originally expected by the subject of the
power”.249 This provides a minimum standard of fairness in contractual performance that courts will expect parties to adhere to, as part of the legal protections
needed around market exchange.
Justice Kasirer’s invocation of arbitrary or capricious exercises of discretion is an
apt example of unlikely reasons for which to provide for a contractual discretion.
Thus, for instance, a law faculty may want wide discretion to decide which courses
it will ask a professor to teach, so that it can factor in considerations such as course
enrolment, other available instructors, experience, workload, leaves, etc. But its
discretion should not be construed as unfettered in the sense that it could decide this
245
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based on consulting a Magic 8 Ball, nor based on personal rivalry or vindictiveness.
Thus, in my view, an expressed intent to make a discretion absolute is more
realistically to be understood as an intent to exclude limitations that might otherwise
be reasonably expected to apply, such as having to make a decision based on one
prominent consideration, or the need to consult a contracting partner or take its
interests into account. In Wastech, for example, the arbitrator was persuaded that the
latter sort of expectations existed due to the long-term and cooperative aspects of the
contract; the Supreme Court explained that the “wide” discretion given to Metro
regarding the disputed waste allocation should be understood as excluding those
expectations.250
Another question to be answered regarding the duty to exercise contractual
discretion in good faith was the status of the duty: did it exist as an implied term in
parties’ contracts, or was it a common law rule? As the Court had earlier held with
respect to the good faith duty of honest performance,251 the duty to exercise
discretion in good faith was likewise said to be a general common law doctrine.252
Two reasons were given for the conclusion that the duty was a common law rule:
first, that consistency with the status of the duty of honest performance enhances the
law’s coherence; and second, that the law presumes that parties would not intend a
discretion to truly be unlimited.253 While both of these propositions may readily be
accepted, neither provides an especially compelling reason for holding that the
status of the duty is a rule of law rather than a term. More compelling are the policy
reasons that inhere in the consequences of that determination: establishing the duty
as a general legal doctrine makes the duty applicable to discretionary powers in
every contract.254 Its presence does not depend on whether or not the parties
provided for it in fact (expressly or by implication), nor on whether or not the
contract is a standard type in which such a term would by default be implied-by-law.
The duty simply applies by operation of law. By thus assuring its application to all
contracts, the duty creates a minimum standard of fair conduct constraining abuse
of contractual discretionary powers. As well, the duty’s status as a rule of law means
it cannot be excluded by the express terms of a contract, as it could if it were an
implied term.255 This too is helpful, in guarding against the risk of the minimum
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standard of fair conduct the duty requires in the exercise of discretionary powers
being carved out of those contracts where discretion is most likely to be abused,
through express terms excluding the duty being pushed on parties of little bargaining
power, or inserted among the form terms of contracts of adhesion.
Looming over some of the issues just discussed is the degree of party autonomy
over permissible exercises of contractual discretion. As mentioned earlier, Brown
and Rowe JJ. espoused an especially strong view of this, including that parties can
control the standard by which the exercise of a discretion is measured by specifying
its purpose, or largely immunize the exercise of a discretion from review by
specifying that it is unfettered. The majority also deferred extensively to party
autonomy, rejecting as discussed above, external measures of fairness such as
community standards, commercial morality or a judicial appraisal. As Kasirer J. saw
it, the duty gave effect to party intention by upholding their reasonable expectations
that a discretionary power would not be used for an ulterior purpose than that set by
the parties themselves.256 Moreover, for parties who might wish to craft their
agreement in a manner that would retain the most party sovereignty over permissible
exercises of a provided discretion, Kasirer J. gave at least some guidance on how
different possible formulations would be treated by courts assessing compliance
with the duty:
the following comment [provides] a general guide. For contracts that grant
discretionary power in which the matter to be decided is readily susceptible of
objective measurement — e.g., matters relating to “operative fitness, structural
completion, mechanical utility or marketability” — the range of reasonable
[exercises] will be relatively smaller. For contracts that grant discretionary power
“in which the matter to be decided or approved is not readily susceptible [to]
objective measurement — [including] matters involving taste, sensibility, personal
compatibility or judgment of the party” exercising the discretionary power — the
range of reasonable [exercises] will be relatively larger.257

A misconception of the duty to exercise contractual discretion in good faith that
both opinions were keen to dispel was that it necessarily required that the party
holding the discretion exercise it in a way that would not harm the interests of the
other party. The arbitrator accepted this proposition,258 which derived from the
statement in Bhasin that “a contracting party should have appropriate regard to the
legitimate contractual interests of the contracting partner.”259 However, as the Court
emphasized in Wastech, that statement could not be read in isolation: Bhasin had
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gone on to say that the meaning of “appropriate regard” and “legitimate interests”
of the other party would vary with the context,260 and “does not require acting to
serve those interests in all cases”.261 Indeed, Cromwell J. had expressly said in
Bhasin that “a party may sometimes cause loss to another — even intentionally —
in the legitimate pursuit of economic self-interest”; what it could not do is “seek to
undermine those interests in bad faith”.262 For this reason, Brown and Rowe JJ. had
said that the dispute in Wastech required no more than a straightforward application
of the principles from Bhasin.263
Perhaps most importantly, Bhasin had also been clear that the principle above is
“not a free-standing rule, but rather a standard that underpins and is manifested in
more specific legal doctrines” that are what directly govern the various situations in
which arise disputes about whether parties had performed a contract in good
faith.264 Thus far, repetition and emphasis of this point from Bhasin has not
succeeded in it being universally understood that in Canadian common law, good
faith is not a general duty, but a general concept that helps explain and inform a
number of specific and discrete doctrines. The above articulation of the principle is
not directly applicable to a dispute, but serves at most — and alongside other
statements from Bhasin, such as those above — to guide application of the actual
doctrines within their own specific terms. The confusion about this is a major factor
in the extent of litigation over good faith that has followed Bhasin, and the
uncertainty observed as surrounding it in practice. For example, Geoff Hall has
written extensively on this uncertainty. It seems to me, however, that Hall treats the
organizing principle as if it were an actual doctrine; as if there were a general duty
of good faith.265 Inadequately attending to this distinction between a duty or
doctrine on one hand, and an organizing concept or principle on the other, in my
view contributes more than anything to the uncertainty around good faith. One
observes, for instance, that freedom of contract is more readily understood as only
a principle or value, not in itself a rule that one can raise as a defence or as an
immunity from other rules. And invocation of that principle is not seen as leading
to problematic uncertainty. The relative novelty of good faith as a general principle
in Canadian common law may therefore be a factor in this confusion. Either way, it
may serve to highlight that good faith is a way of thinking about what kind of
260
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conduct is unfair in the performance of contracts.266
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, a number of significant developments relevant to fairness in
Contract Law transpired in the 2020-2021 Supreme Court term. These included
changes in the law and/or the elaboration of details applicable to control of unfair
terms in standard form contracts, unconscionability, public policy, and the good faith
duties of honest performance and of proper exercise of contractual discretion. As
detailed here, the cases’ discussion of all these matters leave unfinished business,
and it will be interesting to see how the jurisprudence evolves with respect to
remaining questions and problems going forward. As well, additional issues of
fairness in contracts exist and are continually emerging; hence it is welcome to see
the Supreme Court of Canada placing a priority on this important interest in judicial
regulation of markets, with their wide-ranging and profound effects on society.
266
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